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ABSTRACT
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) provides Internet
platforms complete liability protection from user-generated
content. This Article discusses the costs of this current legal
framework and several potential solutions. It proposes three
modifications to the CDA that would use a carrot and stick to
incentivize companies to take a more active role in addressing
some of the most blatant downsides of user-generated content on
the Internet. Despite the modest nature of these proposed changes,
they would have a significant impact.

INTRODUCTION
On October 31, 2017, a truck allegedly driven by Sayfullo
Habibullaevic Saipov sped onto a bike path in New York City. The truck
struck multiple people, killing eight of them. Saipov then allegedly
emerged from the truck and brandished a paintball and pellet gun before
being shot by a police officer.1 Although investigators are still trying to
determine the details of Saipov’s path to radicalization, there is evidence
he was radicalized by exposure to online materials created by the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).2
For years, experts have sounded warnings about how terrorists use
social media and online resources to recruit, train, plan, finance, and
coordinate their activities.3 ISIS has been especially adept at using social
†
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1
See Holly Yan & Dakin Andone, Who is New York Terror Suspect Sayfullo
Saipov?, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/01/us/sayfullosaipov-new-york-attack/index.html.
2
See Nicole Chavez et al., New York Attack Suspect Charged with Federal
Terrorism Offenses, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/01/
us/new-york-attack/index.html.
3
See, e.g., Maeghin Alarid, Recruitment and Radicalization: The Role of Social
Media and New Technology, in IMPUNITY, 313 (Michelle Hughes & Michael
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media to spread its message of hate. 4 Indeed, on a single day in 2014, ISIS
posted nearly 40,000 Tweets. 5
The continued use of the Internet and social media by terrorists
and hate groups to facilitate their activities has fueled a growing debate
about whether the U.S. government should take a more aggressive role in
combating online hate speech. Some have argued that the government
should take a direct role in regulating online content either by classifying
social media websites as public forums or reclassifying the Internet as a
public utility.6 This Article will examine these options and argue that they
would actually make regulating online hate speech more difficult.
Consequently, the better approach to regulating online hate speech
is to amend the Communications Decency Act (CDA). This Article
proposes three specific changes that utilize both a carrot and sticks. The
sticks would remove the current absolute liability protection for social
media platforms for content posted by designated foreign terrorist
organizations and individuals who claim membership in those
organizations. The carrot, however, would provide a safe harbor from
liability protection for companies that institute compliance programs and
make reasonable efforts to remove such content.
Part I of this Article will examine the First Amendment and the
CDA. It will discuss how the marketplace of ideas underpins the First
Amendment. This underpinning helps to explain and justify the Supreme
Court’s incitement jurisprudence. This First Amendment jurisprudence,
combined with the CDA’s liability protection, has created an Internet
where the government has almost no ability to limit hateful online content.
However, companies have huge discretion to determine what content to
allow on their own sites. Part II will discuss several options for the
government to take a more direct, regulatory role online. It will show how
Miklaucic eds., 2016), http://cco.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Impunity
/Article/780274/chapter-13-recruitment-and-radicalization-the-role-of-socialmedia-and-new-tech/; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Use of
the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, THE UNITED NATIONS 3–11 (2012),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Pur
poses.pdf.
4
See ISIL Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment on the
Internet and Social Media; Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement
of Michael Steinbach, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Executive Assistant
Director, National Security Branch).
5
How Terrorists are Using Social Media, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 4, 2014, 4:02
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamicstate/11207681/How-terrorists-are-using-social-media.html.
6
See infra Part II.
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direct government control of the Internet would actually impede
government efforts to combat problematic online speech. Part III will
discuss modifying the CDA to help diminish terrorist hate speech online.
It will put forth several amendments to the CDA and then discuss and
address several possible concerns to the proposal. These proposed
modifications to the CDA would have a significant impact and little
downside.

I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT,
AND THE REALITY ONLINE
The U.S. provides very high protections for speech, both online
and offline.7 Free speech jurisprudence is grounded in the First
Amendment, which provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” 8 Despite its inclusion in the Bill of
Rights, the First Amendment generated little litigation until World War I.9
Current First Amendment jurisprudence is grounded in the
“marketplace of ideas” rationale. This rationale informs the court’s
jurisprudence on incitement and makes it very difficult for (1) speech to
qualify as incitement and (2) the government to censor any content,
including online content. The CDA provides additional protections for
platform providers by absolving them of liability for user-generated
content. Taken together, these three characteristics have created an
environment where it is nearly impossible for the U.S. government to
censor even terrorists’ online speech. Conversely, private companies that
control Internet platforms have a nearly unlimited ability to restrict content
on their sites, although they have little incentive to do so.

A. The Marketplace of Ideas
The marketplace of ideas rationale can be traced back to Justice
Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams v. United States.10 Justice Holmes
stated that the theory behind the U.S. Constitution is “that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
7

See Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV.
651, 688 (2017) (noting that the U.S. “approach to free speech tends to be more
libertarian than Europe’s and Canada’s”).
8
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9
See Alan K Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and
Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 381 (2017) (noting that
“[t]he modern understanding of the free speech doctrine is only about 100 years
old.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as
Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 665, 725 (1992) (stating that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on the First Amendment was a “late bloomer”).
10
250 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

336

of the market.” 11 A few years later in a concurrence, Justice Brandeis
posited that “[t]hose who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties” and “that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” 12
Since then, the marketplace of ideas rationale has gained
widespread acceptance on the Court. 13 Following Abrams, the Court has
repeatedly affirmed the concept as the rationale underlying the First
Amendment.14 It noted that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.” 15 The marketplace of ideas rationale has been influential
in the Court’s Internet-related jurisprudence. For example, the Court held
that portions of the CDA, as originally drafted, violated the First
Amendment by chilling speech and impairing the marketplace of ideas. 16

B. Incitement
The Court’s current interpretation of incitement is also relatively
recent. Its early incitement jurisprudence was heavily influenced by the
current events of the day, namely World War I. 17 In these early cases, the
11

Id. at 630.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
13
See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J.
821, 825 (2008) (noting that “First Amendment doctrine has carried Holmes's
laissez-faire marketplace banner more or less faithfully since Abrams . . .”).
14
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (noting that “The constitutional
right of free expression is . . . . designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity . . .” (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927)); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484) (stating that the constitutional safeguard of freedom of
expression “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”).
15
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding that flag burning was
protected under the First Amendment).
16
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
17
See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing Aikens v.
Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904)) (noting that while “in ordinary times” the
defendant’s advocacy against the draft would be constitutionally protected, “the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (stating that “the
circulation of the paper [which criticized the war effort] was in quarters where a
little breath would be enough to kindle a flame . . . .”).
12
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Court did not require the government show actual or even imminent harm.
Rather, a successful conviction could be based on showing that the
defendant’s actions “had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable
effect” lawless action.18
However, in its landmark decision Brandenburg v. Ohio, the
Court shifted course, adopting a three-part test to determine if speech
qualified as unprotected incitement, requiring the speech be (1) directed
toward inciting or producing (2) imminent lawless actions and (3) likely
to incite or produce such actions. 19 Since Brandenburg, the Court has
clarified that imminent lawless actions must be more than “advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time” 20 and sooner than “weeks or
months” after the speech.21
The Brandenburg test is very difficult for the government to pass.
For example, in one case a boycott organizer threatened to have those who
violated the boycott “disciplined,” saying that “[i]f we catch any of you
going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”22
Though boycott violators were publicly identified, called traitors,23 and
allegedly subjected to violence or threats, 24 the Court held that the
defendant’s actions were constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment.25 Moreover, “[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage
unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it . . . .”26 Therefore,
the Brandenburg conditions are very difficult to meet.
18

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). See also Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925) (reasoning that even though the defendants’
alleged criminal anarchy conviction for publishing a manifesto urging a
communist revolution by mass industrial revolts did not cause “immediate
danger,” the conviction was proper because “[a] single revolutionary spark may
kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and
destructive conflagration.”).
19
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curium).
20
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (holding that defendant’s statement
during an anti-war protest of “We’ll take the fucking street later (or again)”
while standing close to law enforcement officials was not incitement to
imminent illegal action).
21
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
22
Id. at 902.
23
Id. at 903–04.
24
Id. at 904–06.
25
Id. at 928 (stating that “[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot
be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to
stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals . . . . When such
appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected
speech.”).
26
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
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C. The Communications Decency Act
The CDA serves as another significant bar to limiting online
speech. It provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”27 It defines
“information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”28
Website operators, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, can
simultaneously be both operators and content providers. 29
The CDA also specifically notes under its findings that it was
inspired by the marketplace of ideas rationale. 30 The CDA provides a
significant additional protection to online speech that supplements the
already very strong protections provided by the First Amendment and the
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence.

D. Online Hate Speech
Online speech is defined by two main attributes. First, the
government has little independent ability to regulate or censor even the
most egregious online content. Second, companies hosting such content
have a nearly unlimited ability to censor, or not censor, whatever content
they want to on their platforms. Not surprisingly, these conditions have led
to a world in which victims of hate speech or terrorism that is facilitated
by online content have little recourse.
Despite the CDA’s protections, lawsuits have sought to hold
social media websites responsible for some content posted by users. In
particular, several cases have attempted to hold social media companies
liable for deaths in terrorist attacks under the Anti-Terrorism Act. In these
cases, the plaintiffs have alleged that social media companies provided
material support to terrorists who then carried out attacks, including an
attack on government contractors in Jordan31 and terrorist attacks in
Europe.32 For example, one pending complaint alleges that even though
Twitter knew that ISIS was a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization,
27

47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
29
See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2008).
30
47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (stating that “[t]he Internet and other interactive
computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse . . .”).
31
Fields v. Twitter, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d No. 1617165 2018 WL 626800 (9th Cir 2018).
32
Cain v. Twitter, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
2017).
28
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“Twitter has for years knowingly provided its Services to ISIS, its
members, organizations owned or controlled by ISIS, and organizations
and individuals that provide financing and material support to ISIS.”33
Moreover, the complaint alleges that Twitter helped ISIS conduct past
terrorist attacks by aiding ISIS’ internal and external communications,
planning, recruiting, organizing, training, and funding.34 While the court
has not yet ruled on the merits of the that case, another federal district court
dismissed a comparable set of claims, holding that the CDA shielded
Twitter from liability since it was not an information content provider. 35
Additionally, in Klayman v. Zuckerburg the D.C. Circuit
dismissed a similar claim against Facebook. 36 In this case, the plaintiff
alleged intentional assault and negligent breach of duty of care for
Facebook’s failure to promptly remove a page entitled the “Third
Palestinian Intifada.”37 With more than 360,000 members, the page called
for an uprising against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian areas, and
proclaimed that “Judgment Day” would only arrive when “Muslims have
killed all the Jews.” 38 Klayman alleged both he and the Israeli government
had warned Facebook about the page, but Facebook had failed to promptly
remove it. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the D.C. Circuit held
that the CDA barred Facebook’s liability since Facebook was not the
information content provider.39
Despite such pressure, efforts to make significant amendments to
the CDA have not yet been successful. Congress recently passed a narrow
amendment to the CDA that removes the CDA’s liability protections for
sex-trafficking.40 However, the bill is very narrowly tailored and does not
apply to online hate or terrorist speech. 41
Consequently, the U.S. government has engaged in almost no
regulation of online hate speech or incitement on non-government
websites. Conversely, most Internet companies have broad power to police
33

Complaint at 382–83, Cain v. Twitter, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017).
34
Id. at 209–12.
35
Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The court in Cain v. Twitter has not yet
decided the case on the merits; it has merely allowed the case to be transferred
from Southern District of New York to the Northern District of California. Cain
v. Twitter, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017).
36
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (2014).
37
Id. at 1356.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1357–60.
40
See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017,
P.L. 115-164, § 4(a), 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018).
41
See id.
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what information, including user-generated information, is on their
websites. Most websites and web services have user agreements that allow
platforms to determine the type of content they allow on their websites. 42
Thus, private companies have full discretion regarding whether to censor
virtually any content their users post.
Companies’ ability to choose whether or not to censor has been
especially apparent in the wake of a white nationalist rally in
Charlottesville. Even before the Charlottesville rally and its accompanying
violence, Airbnb kicked users off its platform that it thought were
attending the rally. 43 Following the violence in Charlottesville, the webperformance and security company Cloudflare stopped providing services
to the Daily Stormer, a prominent neo-Nazi and white supremacist news
and commentary website, effectively taking it offline. In a statement to his
staff, the CEO wrote “[l]iterally, I woke up in a bad mood and decided
someone shouldn’t be allowed on the Internet.” 44 Additionally, Twitter
and Facebook removed accounts related to white supremacists,45 PayPal

42

See, e.g., Terms of Service, TWITTER (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://twitter.com/en/tos#usUsing (noting that “[w]e reserve the right to remove
Content alleged to be infringing without prior notice, at our sole discretion, and
without liability to you”); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (“[w]e can remove any content or
information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or
our policies.”).
43
Kyle Swenson, Airbnb Boots White Nationalists Headed to ‘Unite the Right’
Rally in Charlottesville, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/08/airbnbboots-white-nationalists-headed-to-unite-the-right-rally-incharlottesville/?utm_term=.0923547c9fc4.
44
Kate Conger, Cloudflare CEO on Terminating Service to Neo-Nazi Site: ‘The
Daily Stormer are Assholes,’ GIZMODO (Aug. 16, 2017, 6:00 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/cloudflare-ceo-on-terminating-service-to-neo-nazi-site1797915295; see also Matthew Prince, Why We Terminated Daily Stormer,
CLOUDFLARE (Aug. 16, 2017) https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-we-terminateddaily-stormer/ (discussing why Cloudflare removed the Daily Stormer).
45
See Rob Price, Charlottesville is a Tipping Point in Silicon Valley’s Approach
to Speech, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:16 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/tech-companies-crack-down-hate-speechcharlottesville-2017-8; see also Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103969849282011 (Facebook founder
Mark Zuckerberg posted on his Facebook page a message condemning the
violence and stating that “we’ve always taken down any post that promotes or
celebrates hate crimes or acts of terrorism -- including what happened in
Charlottesville.”).
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blocked white supremacists from using its services,46 and a dating app
even banned the account of a prominent white supremacist.47
So, while the CDA prevents individuals from holding private
companies liable for third party content on their sites, the companies
themselves have almost unlimited discretion about whether to censor usergenerated content on their sites. This is concerning for several reasons.
First, although private companies have the ability to take down
problematic content, they often act after-the-fact and in a very limited
manner. This is no surprise: searching for content costs money and
removes users from the platform, both of which harm profits.
Consequently, platform providers have little incentive to tightly police
user-generated content on their sites. Moreover, there are often some
platforms that either sympathize with problematic speech or ignore the
negative consequences of the speech in a quest to serve a niche market. 48
Additionally, allowing platforms, especially the largest platforms that are
increasingly central to many people’s lives, to have sole discretion over
what content is allowed and what is prohibited is anti-democratic.49 The
more important and central to modern life such sites become, the more
worrying it becomes for large platforms to lack democratic accountability.

II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND THE DOWNSIDES OF DIRECT
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
This situation has led to calls for greater direct government
involvement and regulation of the Internet. While there are several ways
the government could more directly regulate online content, the Public
Forum Doctrine actually makes such direct government control and
regulation a poor way to reduce online hate speech.

A. Direct Government Regulation?
There are several possibilities for direct government regulation of
online platforms. One possibility is for the government to classify some
46

Matt Stevens, After Charlottesville, Even Dating Apps are Cracking Down on
Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2017, at B3.
47
Id.
48
For example, the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017 was largely
motivated by the actions of Backpage.com, a website that allegedly “create[s] a
marketplace for the sale and purchase of trafficking victims . . . .” See SENATOR
ROBERT PORTMAN, STOP ENABLING SEX TRAFFICKERS ACT OF 2017 1 (2017),
available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
files/serve?File_id=B3F5988E-C4BD-4ACE-A881-6EB9068325B9.
49
John Herrman, How Hate Groups Forced Online Platforms to Reveal Their
True Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2017, at MM18 (noting that “[d]espite their
participatory rhetoric, social platforms are closer to authoritarian spaces than
democratic ones.”).
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websites as public forum. In his opinion in Packingham v. North Carolina,
Justice Kennedy suggested that the Internet, and social media in particular,
may be becoming “essential venues for public gatherings . . . .”50 Kennedy
went so far as to call social media “the modern public square” because it
allows individuals to amplify their speech, including political speech. 51
Justice Kennedy did not discuss the potential impact of classifying some
websites as public forums on online hate speech or incitement.
A second possibility is to classify certain websites or web services
that are increasingly essential to many people’s lives, such as Facebook
and Google, as public utilities. This idea has been floated by those on both
ends of the political spectrum52 as well as discussed by some in the
technology community. 53 The idea is simply that the Internet is essential
to modern life, much like electricity. If classified as a public utility, the
government could theoretically more easily regulate the largest Internet
companies.

B. Public Forum Doctrine and Direct Government Regulation
The Supreme Court uses a forum-based approach to analyze the
level of scrutiny and restrictions the government may place on speech in
government-controlled areas.54 Traditional and designated public forums
are locations either historically used as or designated by the government
as places for public assembly, communications, or other expressive
activity.55 They include, but are not limited to, parks and sidewalks. 56
Limited public forums are created for a specific purpose by the
government.57 In a limited public forum, the government “must respect the
lawful boundaries it has itself set” and cannot prohibit activities related to
the purpose of the forum. 58 Some locations are also designated as
50

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
Id. at 1737 (noting that social media websites “allow a person with an Internet
connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it
could from any soapbox’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
52
See Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to Do to Google, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2017/08/steve-bannon-google-facebook/535473/.
53
See Danah Boyd, Facebook is a Utility, Utilities Get Regulated, APOPHENIA
(May 15, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/
facebook-is-a-utility-utilities-get-regulated.html.
54
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
55
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
56
Id.
57
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (noting that a limited public forum is created for a specific purpose).
58
Id.
51
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nonpublic forums. In such locations, the government may limit speech and
activities to those “compatible with the intended purpose of the
property.” 59 Finally, other areas, such as government funding programs,
are classified as not forums at all. When there is no forum, the government
may advocate for whatever policy it pleases. 60
If subject to direct government control, the Internet would clearly
be a forum; for the Internet to be a non-public forum, most nongovernmental content would have to be removed from the Internet, a
scenario almost impossible to imagine.61 Additionally, a limited public
forum designation would probably too narrowly encapsulate the range of
legal activity that is allowed online: limited public forums are generally
created by the government for specific purposes and allow only selective
access.62
Consequently, the Internet would likely be classified as a public
forum. Classifying certain websites like social media platforms as public
forum, as Justice Kennedy suggests in Packingham, would make
government regulation of hate speech much more difficult. As Justice
Alito pointed out in his concurrence in Packingham, classifying social
media as public forum is “bound to be interpreted by some” as preventing
governmental regulation of social media that would otherwise be
permissible.63 The government is very limited in the ways it can restrict
speech in public forums since there is an especially strong interest in
protecting speech in those spaces. 64 Government regulation of speech in a
public forum is subject to strict scrutiny,65 which means that the regulation
must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn. 66
The strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment has traditionally

59

Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can . . .
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has
not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one
activity to the exclusion of the other.”).
61
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998);
Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 (noting that non-public forums generally consist of largely
government activity or activity very closely related to government action).
62
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804–06
(1985).
63
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J.
concurring).
64
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
65
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
66
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
60

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

344

been very difficult to pass. 67 Therefore, if the Internet were classified as a
public forum, any government restrictions would face a very high bar.

III. MODIFYING THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
A. Proposal
Since courts have interpreted the CDA as giving online platforms,
including social media companies, blanket liability protection, there is
currently little incentive for companies to remove content. In response to
specific and high-profile instances, like the violence in Charlottesville,
platforms may clamp down on some particularly egregious speech or
users. Otherwise, platforms lack strong incentivizes to act—any actions
they take would reduce subscribers and hurt their bottom line. This has
created an Internet where hate speech is too often left unchecked. To best
address this problem, this Article suggests three amendments to the CDA.
Taken together, these changes would lessen terrorist speech online while
having a negligible impact on other speech. Compliance with these
proposals would also not unduly burden Internet platforms.
First, platforms that fail to promptly take down the official
accounts of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) operating
on their websites should lose all liability protections under the CDA.
Platforms could have a duty to remove such content under two
circumstances. First, law enforcement could notify the platform of the
FTO account.68 While notification is an excellent first step, waiting for
notification does not incentivize platforms to actively seek out FTO
accounts. Moreover, companies are often in the best position to mine their
own data, and they have demonstrated a sophisticated ability to identify
traits about customers.69 Consequently, platforms should also have a duty
to make reasonable efforts to monitor their platforms for FTO accounts.
There is no reasonable justification for allowing FTOs to amplify
their messages of hate on online platforms. If a platform knows the FTO
is using its service and fails to stop the FTO, the platform may already be

See David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 147, 148 (2012).
68
See Michelle Roter, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility:
Imposing a “Duty to Take Down” Terrorist Incitement on Social Media, 45
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1404–08 (2017) (proposing that social media
companies have a duty to take down terrorist accounts only after law
enforcement notification).
69
See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at
MM30 (discussing Target’s use of data mining to determine a customer was
pregnant before her family knew about the pregnancy).
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violating the terrorist material support statute. 70 It makes little sense, then,
for platforms to have civil liability protection when they potentially have
criminal liability. Removing the CDA’s civil liability shield is likely to
provide a greater incentive for companies to modify their behavior than
criminal penalties because private parties are often more likely to sue than
the government.
Additionally, designation as an FTO reflects the political
branches’ determination that the group is a foreign terrorist organization
and harmful to U.S. interests. Although law enforcement and intelligence
agencies may gain some intelligence from terrorist accounts and
websites,71 there is little reason to think that this change to the CDA would
significantly impair intelligence gathering. Many other means of gathering
intelligence would remain, including examining the statements such
organizations make to the news media, signals intelligence, or other
traditional intelligence means. What such a prohibition would do is make
it harder for FTOs to spread their messages, solicit donations, and recruit
new adherents.
Consequently, to make it much more difficult for FTOs to spread
their messages, Congress should amend the CDA to add the following
language, or language to a similar effect:
§ 230(c)(3): An interactive computer service provider may be treated
as the publisher or speaker of such content if the provider knows or
should have known the content was provided by a designated foreign
terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. § 1189.

Second, the CDA should no longer provide liability protection for
companies that fail to remove user-generated content of individuals who
explicitly self-identify as members of an FTO. Similar to identifying FTO
accounts, platforms should likely have little trouble finding such content
since this exception to the CDA’s blanket protection would only apply to
individuals who explicitly self-identified as members of FTOs. Moreover,
this provision would be narrowly tailored to only apply to individuals that
meet the demanding standards of “personnel” under 18 U.S.C. 2339B(h).72
70

See id.
See Benjamin Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Tweeting Terrorists, Part III: How Would
Twitter Defend Itself Against a Material Support Prosecution, LAWFARE (Feb.
14, 2016, 7:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-iiihow-would-twitter-defend-itself-against-material-support-prosecution (noting
that there may be security benefits in “being able to follow what terrorist groups
are thinking and trying to communicate to their followers[.]”) .
72
The statute provides that:
No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the
term ‘personnel’ unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted
71
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Removing blanket liability protection for user-generated content
authored by explicitly self-identified members of FTOs would incentivize
companies to proactively remove the most problematic user-generated
content on their platforms. Consequently, the CDA should be modified so
that it includes the following language:
§ 230(c)(4): U.S.C. § 230(c) shall not be interpreted as providing
interactive computer service providers immunity from private civil
suits for information content authored by publishers or speakers who
(A) publicly identify themselves as members of an organization
that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under
8 U.S.C. § 1189,
(B) qualify as “personnel” under 18 U.S.C. 2339B(h), and
(C) the information service provider failed to promptly remove
such content.

Finally, as long as platforms make reasonable, good faith efforts,
they should continue to enjoy liability protection for user-generated
content.73 One way to determine if platforms are taking reasonable steps
would be to create a certification program. Such a program could be selfcertified and similar to the U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield74 or the Department
of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology Critical
Infrastructure for Cybersecurity Framework. 75 Since technology changes
so quickly, the requirement should be broad. To create such a safe harbor,
the CDA could include the following language:

to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with
1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under
that terrorist organization's direction or control or to organize, manage,
supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.
Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist
organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered
to be working under the foreign terrorist organization's direction and
control.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2015).
73
See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:
Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 419 (2017)
(proposing a modification to the CDA that requires companies to make
reasonable efforts to remove unlawful user-generated content on their platforms
to receive liability protection).
74
See Welcome to the Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome (last visited Dec. 9, 2017).
75
See Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity-framework (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
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§ 230(c)(5): Any provider of an interactive computer service that has
made good faith efforts to comply with 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(3) and (4)
shall not be deemed to be a publisher or speaker. Such reasonable
efforts may include a self-certification scheme that satisfies
requirements approved by the Department of Commerce.

B. Discussion
Together, these three amendments would have a significant
impact without raising many of the complications of some other suggested
modifications to the CDA. First, the lack of direct government regulation
would avoid the stringent forum analysis required by reclassifying the
Internet as a public forum or utility.
In contrast to some other proposals,76 these measures would also
be unlikely to raise other First Amendment challenges. Even assuming
these proposals would be classified as restrictions on speech and not
conduct,77 they would still almost certainly be constitutional under
Humanitarian Law Project (HLP). In HLP, the Court held that it was
permissible for the government to bar organizations from engaging in
activities such as training FTOs in “how to use humanitarian and
international law to peacefully resolve disputes.”78 The Court emphasized
the strong government “interest in combating terrorism” could outweigh
burdens on speech. 79 These proposals here clearly address a very strong
interest in the government preventing terrorists from using platforms to
organize, recruit, train, and fundraise. Moreover, they would merely
remove protections for platforms that knew or should have known about
activity much more directly related to foreign terrorism than the activities
the Court found the government could restrict in HLP. In HLP, the Court
also showed great deference to the political branches’ determination of
76

See Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice But to Consider Limits on Speech,
SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalization_eff
orts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html (proposing a law that that the
author acknowledges would likely be unconstitutional under current doctrine
that would make it a crime to access or share links of “websites that glorify,
express support for, or provide encouragement for ISIS or support recruitment
by ISIS”); Citron & Wittes, supra note 73, at 411 (noting that “[u]nless the
[Supreme] Court upends the table, it is hard to imagine a retreat from the broadsweeping interpretation of § 230 adopted in the state and lower federal courts.”).
77
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–28 (2010)
(discussing when to apply the more stringent First Amendment speech analysis
and when to apply the less stringent conduct analysis).
78
Id. at 36 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, n. 1
(9th Cir. 2009)).
79
Id. at 28–30.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

348

what measures were needed to protect national security. 80 If Congress
amended the CDA, and the president approved the changes, the Court
might show this deference again. Like the statute in question in HLP, the
proposed provision is also very limited and applies to only designated
foreign terrorist organizations. 81 Additionally, the measures here would
not impose criminal liability, and would merely remove a shield
precluding civil liability.
Moreover, this proposal is very narrowly tailored. Speech that
promoted similar end goals (i.e. the political goals of FTOs), but simply
was authored by those not affiliated with the FTO, would retain complete
liability protection under the CDA. Consequently, these proposals would
merely incentivize platforms to take proactive measures to remove some
of the worst content on their websites but would not chill other speech.
Additionally, in recognition of the sheer volume of user-generated content
posted on their sites, this proposal offers companies complete liability
protection if they make reasonable efforts. Platforms would also only lose
complete liability protection for content authored by self-proclaimed
members of FTOs; any private plaintiffs intending to sue the platforms
would still have to prove the platform had a duty to remove the content
and the platform’s failure to remove the content caused injury.
Removing the nearly unlimited protections the CDA provides
Internet platforms would not lead to the destruction of the Internet as we
know it. It has been noted that “[i]n the technology world, § 230 of the
CDA is a kind of sacred cow–an untouchable protection of nearconstitutional status.”82 However, there is a growing realization that the
current regime is not adequately policing the most problematic online
content, and Congress has recently acted to make minor changes to the
CDA.83 This initial Congressional action could facilitate further changes
to the CDA. 84 Additionally, the changes proposed here are modest and
clearly defined. Companies would receive safe harbor protections when
they make reasonable efforts to comply. Moreover, the amount required
to be done to receive the safe harbor protection could vary by the size of
the platform; so, small platforms could have significantly lower burdens.
Id. at 33–34 (noting that “[t]hat evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like
Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference. This litigation implicates
sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs.”).
81
See id. at 35.
82
Citron & Wittes, supra note 73, at 409.
83
See Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield For Facebook, Google Is
About To Change, NAT’L PUB. R ADIO (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:11 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/section230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change.
84
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Consequently, there’s no reason to think the sky would fall if the CDA is
modified a small amount as this Article proposes.
These proposals also avoid the imposition of new criminal
penalties on companies that fail to adhere to the current minimal legal
requirements to take down third party content.85 Additional criminal
penalties are likely to result in a significant backlash from technology
companies, harming the feasibility of the plan. These proposals simply
allow more moderate civil penalties in addition to the existing criminal
penalties under the Terrorist Material Support statutes. Consequently, they
would provide an intermediate civil enforcement mechanism when
criminal penalties are inappropriate or not purused.
Identifying the official FTO accounts and the accounts of those
who specifically self-identify as FTO members would be relatively
straightforward. FTOs are a distinct, easily enforceable category since they
are identified by the State Department. 86 While there are some fake or
copycat accounts, many FTO accounts are readily identifiable. 87 Platforms
are also adept as mining their own data88 and there are already companies
that specialize in filtering user-generated content89 that could likely
develop methods to filter for FTO accounts. Moreover, companies would
receive safe harbor protections when they made reasonable efforts to
comply, protecting them from liability stemming from difficult to identify
accounts.
While they do not restrict as much content as some would like,
these proposals are probably close to the outer limits of what would be
allowed under current First Amendment jurisprudence. Despite the modest
85

See Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance Programs and the
War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 56–57 (2017) (proposing a
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U. CHI. L.J. 1181, 1212 (2017) (proposing an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A,
which deals with terrorist material support, to “include the provision of a social
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86
See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
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87
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nature of the proposed changes, they would have a real impact. Companies
have been at pains to point out how much they rely on the CDA’s liability
protections.90 Unlike some proposals that encourage companies to bury
their heads in the sand,91 by threatening to remove the complete liability
protections they enjoy under the CDA these proposed amendments would
incentivize platforms to take an active role in combating some of the most
problematic online speech. Importantly, these changes would likely
encourage more platforms to institute internal mechanisms to search for
truly problematic content. Consequently, platforms may err on the side of
caution and restrict more problematic content than these proposals would
in actuality require. By keeping the government’s role in policing online
content minimal, these proposals would also avoid significant concerns
about government censorship.

IV. CONCLUSION
For all of its positives, there is a dark side to the Internet. Not
enough is being done to limit truly harmful online speech. But, it is no
surprise that little is being done. The First Amendment and the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence make it very difficult to prosecute incitement.
Moreover, the CDA offers Internet platforms complete liability protection
for user-generated content. Platforms have a natural tendency to focus on
profits instead of potentially banning some of their users. These three
factors all push in the same direction and have created an Internet with too
much harmful speech.
The most effective way to address this problem is to incentivize
platforms to be part of the solution. The proposals here utilize both a carrot
and a stick: they offer continued blanket liability protection only on the
condition that platforms seriously commit to policing the worst of the
worst user-generated content on their sites. The additional actions
companies would have to take under these proposals would be modest but
would go a long way towards addressing some of the very serious
downsides of the current regime.
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